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TWENTY YEARS OF THE NLRB:
UNIT AND CONTRACT BAR PROBLEMS
IN REPRESENTATION CASES
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INTRODUCTION
The two decades since the Wagner Act became law on July 5,
1935 have seen momentous changes in the internal structure of the
American economy, brought about by an increase in trade union mem-
bership from approximately three million in 1935 to over 15,000,000
at the present time. Economists have discussed the changed status of the
American worker; politicians and political scientists have been concerned
with the new leverage, or lack of it, of a greatly expanded labor move-
ment; management has been compelled to make far-reaching adjustments
in its way of doing *business; and labor has found itself faced with novel
responsibilities and complex new issues. This article attempts to deal
only with a small facet of that history; the role played 'by the National
Labor Relations Board in deciding unit and contract bar issues in repre-
sentation cases. In those twenty years, about 12,000,000 persons have
voted in 78,614 elections conducted by the NLRB. The decided cases
dealing with these issues are so numerous that it is possible to sketch only
the highlights.
Section 9 of the Wagner Act provided the legal structure for the
holding of industrial elections by the Government. The charter given
the NLRB was extremely broad; the only statutory requirement was
that the Board have "reasonable cause to believe that a question of rep-
resentation affecting commerce exists". Section 9 (b) of the Act author-
ized the Board to find appropriate "an employer unit, craft unit, plant
unit or subdivision thereof" thereby granting the Board an almost un-
limited discretion in finding appropriate units. It was entirely silent on
the question whether and under what circumstances an existing collective
agreement should operate to bar the holding of an election,
The Wagner Act sought to achieve different, and sometimes
irreconcilable, goals. The preamble of the Act spoke of the "stabiliza-
tion of wage rates and working conditions" in order to minimize strikes
and depressions. It called on the Board to encourage "the practice and
procedure of collective bargaining". It sought to guarantee "the exercise
by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and desig-
nation of representatives of their own choosing". Often these goals are
not inconsistent; frequently they are. Holding an election in the face
of an existing'collective agreement achieves the statutory goal of "full
freedom" for workers, but can hardly be said to "stabilize" working
conditions, and it may be doubted whether it "encourages" collective
*Attorney and Assistant General Counsel, National Labor Relations Board,
1935-1942, General Counsel 1946-1947; Member, Firm of Van Arkel and Kaiser,
Labor Attorneys, Washington D. C. 1947.
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bargaining. The Board can recognize the "full freedom" of a group of
employees who do not desire collective bargaining by excluding them
from an appropriate unit, though it thereby discourages the practice of
collective bargaining. The unauthorized strike vividly demonstrates the
full freedom of workers, but can hardly be said to aid the practice of
collective bargaining or the achievement of stabilized wage rates and
working conditions. It is the thesis of this survey that the Board initially
stressed the concept of "full freedom" in dealing with these problems and
that the intervening two decades have been marked by an increasing
emphasis on stabilization of labor relations.
THE INFLUENCE OF PREDECESSOR BOARDS ON THE NLRB
The immediate historical background profoundly influenced the
early decisions of the NLRB. There was, first, the experience of the
National Mediation Board under the Railway Labor Act.
That Act' had provided machinery for the conduct of elections on
the railroad systems of the country. Its constitutionality had been sus-
tained in Texas and New Orleans R.R. v. Brotherhood of Clerks.
The rest of the labor movement regarded with a certain envy the pro-
tections and services accorded railway workers. The Act on the whole
had worked well, due in no small part to the fact that it had had the
support of both railway management and labor at the time of its passage.
The jurisdictional lines of the railroad brotherhoods were sufficiently
clear so that the Board had been required only rarely, and then only in
the case of minor fringe groups, to decide issues of the appropriate "craft
or class" under the Act.
There was, secondly, the experience of the Automobile Labor
Board, appointed under the National Industrial Recovery Act on March
24, 1934, to settle a threatened strike in the industry, with Professor Leo
Wolman as Chairman. Section 7 (a) of the NRA did not specify
"majority rule"; i.e., the right of the majority union in an appropriate
unit to speak for all employees. The Automobile Labor Board adopted a
rule of proportional representation. Employees voted for individual rep-
resentatives, and could "specify" to which group the representative should
belong. The Board noted in its report of February 5, 1935 that,
The total of such specifications throughout the plant for
each of such groups will determine the proportion which each
of such groups will have on the bargaining agency ....
The Board thereby proposed to set up organizations more like German
works councils than traditional American trade unions. The Board
also held elections on its own motion (rather than when requested by
unions), thus adopting the pattern of political elections. The results, from
a trade union point of view, were disastrous; of over 53,000 votes cast
in the industry, nearly 41,000 were "unaffiliated" and the American
144 Stat. 577, 45 U. S. C. §152 (1926).
2 281 U. S. 548 (1930).
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Federation of Labor received only slightly more than 2,000 votes. The
Board never resolved the most obvious question; namely, how were
"unaffiliated" voters to select a representative to bargain for them? And
the manner of timing elections made impossible the organizational and
propaganda drive necessary for trade union success, particularly in
circumstances where an elaborate system of industrial espionage and
discriminatory discharges made such work difficult and often physically
dangerous. The hostility of labor to the policies of the Board was suf-
ficiently vigorous to secure statutory recognition in the Wagner Act of
two important doctrines: majority rule and the holding of elections only
upon the request of unions.
Third, the new NLRB inherited the personnel, and hence many
of the traditions, of the old National Labor Relations Board which had
been appointed by President Roosevelt pursuant to Public Resolution
No. 443 of June 29, 1934, under the Chairmanship of Dean Lloyd
Garrison and, subsequently, Francis Biddle. In adopting the Wagner
Act, the Congress had drawn extensively on its experience and had
given statutory approval of its principal doctrines. In general, that Board
had made the probable success or failure of a bona fide union the key
to directing elections. Denials of elections rested on such grounds as
"There is no evidence that a substantial number of the employees desire
an election . . ., that "The union undeniably represents ...a majority
of the employees ...The Company should recognize the union"' that
"the company is still preculiarly anxious that an election be conducted.
.. Our suspicion that this anxiety on the part of the company is directed
less towards helping its employees to achieve true collective bargaining
status than it is in thwarting the efforts made by the Brotherhood"' .
The bargaining unit was frequently defined as "production workers"'
or "that group of employees eligible for membership in" the union.8
The decisions of the old NLRB contain few examples of conflicts
between legitimate unions concerning appropriate bargaining units. In
most cases, the formula of "production and maintenance" workers
sufficed, for the thrust of the new organizing effort was principally
in industrial plants. But in the course of its decisions it formulated a
series of criteria which it considered relevant to a determination of the
problem of the appropriate unit; the community of interest of the em-
ployees, eligibility for membership in the union seeking the election,
their functional coherence, geographical proximity, and the history of
bargaining relationships9 , which have been largely relied on by all their
Quccessors.
3 H. R. R s., 375, 73d CONG. 2d SEss. (1934).
4 Ward Baking Co., II N.L.R.B. (old) 47, 50 (1934).
5"Carson Pirie Scott, II N.L.R.B. (old) 506 (1935).
6 John E. Lucey Shoe Co., II N.L.R.B. (old) 251, 255 (1935).
7 American Oak Leather, II N.L.R.B. (old) 82 (193;).
8 Acme Machine Products Co., II N.L.R.B. (old) 71 (1934).
1Index, II N.L.R.B. (old) 555 (1935).
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While the old National Labor Relations Board decided these issues,
its opinions were largely academic. Public Resolution No. 44 provided
judicial review of election orders in the circuit courts of appeals; delays
were such that Chairman Biddle in testifying before the Senate Labor
Committee on the Wagner Act in March, 1935,10 stated that,
In every case where the employers have not consented to
the holding of the election . . the employer has succeeded in
tying up the enforcement of the order.
The current decisions of the Supreme Court had encouraged a
widespread belief that the Wagner Act would be held unconstitutional.
The decision in Schechter Poultry Company v. U. S.," holding the Na-
tional Industrial Recovery Act unconstitutional, had eliminated the
statutory authority of the old NLRB and placed the new Board under
an ominous cloud. For nearly the first two years of its life, the Board
operated without effective enforcement powers and hence without real
authority.
At least one other factor impinging on the early work of the NLRB
warrants mention: The tradition of "voluntarism" in the American
Labor movement. Professor John R. Commons of the University of
Wisconsin had been its principal exponent; he had elaborated his views
with explicitness in stating his minority views as a member of the Com-
mission on Industrial Relations in 1916.12
The opinion that it was unwise to introduce the Government into
problems of organization and collective bargaining, while subdued in
1935, had not been extinguished. It was recognized that the power to
decide the "appropriate unit" carried with it the power to shape the
future growth of the labor movement. Yet it was obvious that these
matters had to be decided if elections were to be held. The comparative
'OHearings Before the Senate Labor Committee, 73rd CONG., 2d SEss.
97 (1935).
11295 U. S. 495 (1935).
12 Final Report of Commission on Industrial Relations, Report of Com-
missioners Commons and Harriman, vol. 1. p. 212 where he had observed,
If the State recognized any particular union by requiring the em-
ployer to recognize it, the State must necessarily guarantee the union to
the extent that it must strip it of any abuses that it may practice. The
State might be compelled to regulate its initiation fees and dues, its
apprenticeship ratio, its violation of agreements, and all of the other
abuses on account of which the employer refuses to deal with it . . .
there is no place where the State can stop if it brings compulsion to
bear on the employers without also regulating by compulsion the unions
.. . two opposing organizations, equally strong, are able to drive out
abuses practiced by the other.
Some portion at least of this prophetic utterance has been confirmed
by the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. Section 8(b) (5) forbade unions to
charge "excessive or discriminatory" dues; section 301 granted new
remedies, and perhaps new substantive rights, for union breaches of
agreements, and section 8(d) was added to impose new obligations with
respect to the modification or termination of agreements.
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ease with which these questions had been decided by the old NLRB and
the Mediation Board quieted many doubts. The forces that were to
lead to the split in the labor movement following the suspension of the
Committee for Industrial Organization were but dimly perceived. The
attitude of labor at the time of the passage of the Act was summed up
in testimony given by Judge Joseph Padway, then General Council
of the AF of L, in 1939,"s
... in providing legislation (the Wagner Act) . . . labor did
not think it was surrendering its philosophy of 'voluntarism', its
right to regulate and conduct its own internal affairs, and to
maintain and change its form and structure as it deemed wise
and proper without governmental intervention,
and
The National Labor Relations Act was devised to deal
with conflicts between employers and labor. It was not devised
to deal with conflicts between national organizations.
INtrI.L NLRB ViEws
Thus the factors impinging on the new NLRB all counselled
generosity in the directing of elections. There was, first, the sense of
frustration felt by the Board and the labor movement in the inability of the
old and the new NLRB to make election orders effective, coupled with
the harrassment Of a spate of injunctions and unresolved constitutional
doubts. It was thus not surprising that the NLRB seized such oppor-
tunities ag were presented to hold elections. There was, second, an ac-
celerating interest and activity in the organization of unions and a
favorable political climate; the direction and holding of an election
showed Government interest in, and to a degree sympathy for, those
trends. Initially, at least, there was not that division within the labor
movement that later made many decisions appear partisan to tle AF
of L or the CIO.
Conforming to the tradition of "voluntarism", the Board early
adopted a policy of not being drawn into inter-union conflicts in a
conscious effort to leave their solution to the voluntaiy machinery of the
American Federation of Labor. In Aluminum Company of America, 4
the Board said in such a case that
Such a question, involving solely and in a peculiar fashion
the internal affairs of the American Federation of Labor and
its chartered bodies can best be decided by the parties them-
selves.
The same rule was applied in Axton-Fisher Tobacco Conpany. 5
There the Tobacco Workers Union and the Machinists Union both
claimed jurisdiction over machine fixers. Both Unions were affiliates of the
13 Hearings Before the House Committee on Education and Labor 76th
CONG., 1st SEss. 822 (1939).
14 1 N.L.R.B. 530 (1936).
15 1 N.L.R.B. 604 (1936).
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AF of L. In refusing to decide the despute, the Board noted that "juris-
dictional disputes!' had long existed, and observed,
While the Act provides a new vocabulary in which such
jurisdictional disputes may be described, it does not alter their
nature.... Obviously a craftsman will join the Union to which
other members of his craft belong and which is recognized by
American Federation of Labor as having jurisdiction over that
craft . . . the issue remains as simply a jurisdictional dispute
between two unions....
The Board rested its hands-off policy on the ground that
It is preferable that in the light of the declared policy of
Congress--'the exercise by workers of full freedom of associa-
tion, self-organization and designation of representatives of
their own choosing'r-the Board should leave organizations of
labor free to work out their own solutions through the pro-
cedure they themselves have established for that purpose.
But the policy was short-lived. On September 5, 1936, the Con-
vention of the AF of L suspended the unions affiliated with the Com-
mittee for Industrial Organization. The Board was thereupon con-
strained to hold, in Interlake Iron Corporation6 that though two com-
peting unions both retained a technical affiliation with the AF of L,
"we would be blind, indeed, to facts of common knowledge if we
therefore concluded that both unions would submit to the authority of
that body". It therefore refused to dismiss the case on the ground that
a "jurisdictional dispute" was involved and directed an election. Where
two or more unions were affiliated with the same parent body, the Board
continued to follow the rule of the Axton-Fisher case17 except in cases
where a third organization, unaffiliated with the same parent body, also
sought to represent employees. 18
In these cases, the Board for the first time wrestled with some
semantic problems. In the Axton-Fisher case, for example, the question
whether machine fixers should or should not be included with machinists
or production workers presents a rather typical question of the "ap-
propriate unit". To the organizations involved, and to the Board, it
was a "jurisdictional dispute" since both unions asserted that the AF of
L had assigned them "jurisdiction" over these workers. In a slightly
different context-if the Machinists, for example, insisted that their
members do machine fidng-it would appear to be a dispute over
"assignment of work". The Board noted that a "new vocabulary" was
involved, but insisted that the essential nature of the dispute had not
changed. These problems assumed a new importance after the passage
of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947.19
162 N.L.R.B. 1036 (1937).
17 Curtis Bay Towing, 4 N.L.R.B. 360 (1937); Weyerhauser Timber Co.,
16 N.L.R.B. 902 (1939).
18 Long Bell Lumber Co., 16 N.L.R.B. 892 (1939).
19 infra, pp. 368-69.
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THE EMERGING CRAFT-INDUSTRIAL UNIT PROBLEM
The new NLRB, building on the work of its predecessor, began
to refine the considerations -to be relied on in determining appropriate
bargaining units. In its Second Annual Report,20 it set forth at length
the factors which had influenced its decisions: the history of labor relations
in the industry, and in the particular enterprise; the present form of self-
organization; the eligibility of employees to membership in labor organi-
zations involved in the dispute; and the mutual interest of employees,
including such factors as the nature of the work performed, the degree
of skill required, the wages paid, the degree of supervisory status enjoyed,
the permanence or casualness of their work, their functional coherence
and their geographic proximity. While the question of the appropriate
unit raised many problems, 'by all odds the most dramatic was the issue
between "craft" and "industrial" unionism. These not-too-accurate terms
purported to draw the line between AF of L, or traditional, trade
unionism, and CIO, or mass, trade unionism. Interlake Iron had set the
stage for drawing the Board into the conflict, and thereafter this single
issue gave the Board more difficulty than any other.
Within a year, the Board had added another criterion which it
emphasized: The "desire of employees as to inclusion in the appropriate
unit."2 The new language was the result of the decision in Globe Ma-
chine and Stan.ping Co.2  In that case the Board announced that "where
the considerations (between craft and industrial unionism) are so evenly
balanced, the determining factor is the desire of the men themselves"
and directed that craft workers be separately polled; if they voted for
the craft union, the Board would find that unit appropriate, and if for
the industrial union, would find an over-all unit.
Though this rationale was couched in terms of "the desire of the
men themselves", it clearly met the desires of craft unionists; indeed, in
1939 when the AF of L proposed amendments to the Act, its proposal
on this issue was to write the Globe doctrine into the Act. It would
seem entirely clear, also, that Judge J. Warren Madden, the Chairman of
the Board and the chief proponent of the Globe doctrine, was em-
phasizing the "freedom of association" concept of the statute. "Desires
of the men themselves" is an obviously elusive phrase until the question
"What men?" is answered; doubtless many rank-and-file workers desired
to associate the superior economic strength of the skilled workers with
their cause. And the craftsmen might justifiably fear a dilution of that
same bargaining strength, on the grounds pointed out by one com-
mentator,
23
20 2 N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 125-40 (1937).
21 3 N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 167 (1938).
223 N.L.R.B. 294 (1937).
23 Summer Schlichter, The Present Status of Industrial Relations, Speech
Before the Associated Industries of Cleveland, March 12, 1954, 33 LRRM 36, 43.
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The craftsmen have learned that the industrial unions
frequently do not give them very adequate representation.
Many industrial unions have bargained for cents-per-hour wage
increases rather than percentage wage increases. Thus, the
differential between the semi-skilled workers and skilled crafts-
men has been substantially reduced. Now the craftsmen are
.endeavoring to sever themselves from industrial unions.
Board Member Edwin Smith, who had concurred in the Globe
decision, shortly began to emphasize statutory objectives other than
"feedom of association". He formulated his views in Allis-Chalmers
Manufacturing Co.24 where he dissented from a decision applying the
Globe doctrine because,
Permitting minorities to set themselves off, as all the in-
dications are they would do in this instance, succeeds in pro-
viding full self-determination for the minority but only at the
expense of disregarding the interests of the majority.
The statute states that the Board shall decide in each case
the appropriate bargaining unit in order to insure to employees
the full benefit of their right to self-organization and to col-
lective bargaining . . . the policies of the Act are clearly
aimed at establishing that form of collective bargaining which
will be most likely to lead to industrial stability and peace ...
If (the crafts) bargain separately, by so much is the united
economic strength of the employees as a whole weakened.
If the "united economic strength" would be "weakened", it is
fair to inquire whether this would be at the expense of the employer,
the craftsmen, or both? "Effective collective bargaining" rather than
"freedom of association", in any event, was here emphasized as the
statutory goal.
A third element was introduced with the appointment of Dr.
William Leiserson to the Board in 1939. In Milton-Bradley Co.,25 he
gave it as his view that "Congress intended to adopt the designation
'bargaining unit' as determined by the working agreements voluntarily
made by the employees with their employers" and asserted that "only
by considering itself bound by the bargaining units established and main-
tained by collective bargaining contracts can an administrative board
keep itself from taking sides in jurisdictional controversies among labor
organizations which differ as to the most effective form of organization
for collective bargaining purposes". Chairman Madden insisted that
this rule made it "in practical effect impossible, after a contract has once
been made with an industrial union, for craft groups of employees ever
to obtain craft units ...."
As might be expected, Board Member Smith concurred in the
denial of craft severance involved in the Milton-Bradley rule. That
244 N.L.R.B. 159 (1937).
25 15 N.L.R.B. 938 (1939).
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decision, was followed by American Can Co.,28 and the doctrine that a
settled pattern of bargaining on an industrial basis would not be disturbed
in order to allow craft severance was thereafter known under that
name.
It should be emphasized that these pronouncements were followed
in no doctrinaire fashion; in numerous cases each Board member departed
from these asserted criteria." The "evenly balanced considerations"
test of the Globe case itself allowed a considerable room for maneuver,
and it was not difficult to find flaws, where that seemed desirable, in the
"history of bargaining on an industrial basis". By the time of Bethlehem
Steel Company2 8 in 1941, the Board allowed craft severance to pattern
makers because they constituted "a well established and highly skilled
craft requiring a long apprenticeship."
TAFT-HARTLEY AND THE CRAFT-INDUSTRIAL UNIT PROBLEM
This was the situation at the time of the Taft-Hartley Act.29
That Act muddied rather than settled the craft-industrial union dispute
by providing in Section 9 (b) that the NLRB "shall not. . . decide that
any craft unit is inappropriate . . . on the ground that a different unit
has been established by a prior Board determination, unless a majority of
the employees in the proposed craft unit vote against separate representa-
tion", leaving open the question whether the Board might not, despite
a prior determination, find an industrial unit still appropriate on other
grounds. The limited impact of this change on the craft-industrial union
controversy was soon apparent in National Tube Co.,3 ' where the
Board refused to sever out a craft of bricklayers in the basic steel industry,
thereby substantially reaffirming the rule in the American Can case.
With the advent of the Eisenhower Administration in 1953, and
the appointment of Chairman Farmer and other new members to the
NLRB, it was thought that the craft severance problem should again be
investigated. If any generalization can fairly be made concerning admini-
stration of this problem during twenty years of the Act, it is that each
new Board member devotes his first weeks in office to formulating the
craft severance rules which he intends to follow, and the remainder of
his term finding reasons for creating exceptions to those rules. The new
Board members followed the traditions of their predecessors and scheduled
28 13 N.L.R.B. No. 126, (1939).
27Thus, Chairman Madden denied severance in American Hardware Corp.
4 N.L.R.B. 412 because of a doubt whether the group sought to be severed was
a true craft; Board Member Smith applied the Globe doctrine in Shell Chemical
Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 259; Dr. Leiserson consented to the severance of pattern makers
in the face of a history of bargaining on an industrial basis in Maryland Dry
Docks Co., 23 N.L.R.t. No. 95. These examples, chosen almost at random, could
be multiplied many times over.
2832 N.L.R.B. No. 176 (1941); see also Dain Manufacturing Co., 29
N.L.ThB. No. 93 (1941).
29 Public Law 101, c. 120, 80th Cong. 1st Sess., 1947.
3076 N.L.R.B. 1199 (1948).
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elaborate arguments in American Potash and Chemical Corp., where
units of electrical and power house employees sought severance from
an industrial unit. The majority in denying severance said that they
did not "deem it wise or feasible to upset a pattern of bargaining already
firmly established" and therefore affirmed the continued vigor of the
National Tube case. But, they added, they would allow severance where
"a true craft group is sought and where, in addition, the union seek-
ing to represent it is one which traditionally represents the craft". The
majority said that it proposed "to exercise great care in making certain
that . . . only groups exercising genuine craft skills will be embraced
within the ambit of the rule". Board Member Peterson, dissenting,
thought the new rule would have serious consequences.
Unions . . . now have an open invitation to invade
industries and plants where stable industrial-type bargaining
relations have existed for a substantial period. . . .The ma-
jority's decision gives positive assurance that a raid will not be
turned aside ... no matter how compelling the evidence....
It would appear that the Board has found these criteria no more
completely dispositive of concrete cases than their predecessors did their
formulations. In Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 2 the Board found that
the maintenance electricians sought to be severed did not "exercise the
gamut of skills characteristic of the electricians' craft"; in Mills In-
dustries, Inc.,3 3 over Member Rodgers' dissent, severance was refused
to a group of machine repairmen who, the majority found, "may prop-
erly be regarded as members of a craft which the Petitioner has tradi-
tionally represented"; since then the exceptions to the rules of the
.merican Potash & Chemical Corp. case have been approximately as
numerous as their applications.
34
SECTION 8 (b) (4) (D) AND UNIT PROBLEMS
A new confusion in dealing with the problem of the "appropriate
unit" has been introduced by Section 8 (b) (4) (D) of the Taft-Hartley
Act, which makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to force or
require an employer "to assign particular work to employees in a particu-
lar labor organization or in a particular trade, craft or class" rather
than to employees in another labor organization or trade, craft or class.
The difficulty derives from the semantic problem involved in distinguish-
ing a dispute about "an appropriate unit", from a question of "jurisdic-
tion" or "assignment of work".
The Congress clearly stated that under Taft-Hartley "the primary
strike for recognition (without a Board certification) is not proscribed"."
31107 N.L.R.B. No. 290 (1954).
32108 N.L.R.B. No. 36 (1954).
33108 N.L.R.B. No. 49 (1954).
3 4 See, Krislov The N.L.R.B. on Craft Severance; One Year of American
Potash, LABOR LAiv JOURNAL. May 1955. CCH
35 S. REP. 105, 80th CONG., 1st Sss. 22 (1947).
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If a union may strike for recognition, it appears to follow that it may
strike for recognition to represent employees in some unit which it deems
appropriate, absent a certification of another union. It would appear that
this was all that was involved in Local Union No. 5-265, Wood-
workers."0 The Union there had contracts with two employers, covering
tvo mills. The Employers jointly erected a third mill, but refused to
extend the agreement to the new mill, and refused a Union demand
that laid off workers at the two mills he hired at the new operation. It
would appear that this was no more than a strike for recognition over
a unit deemed proper by the Union. But the Board held it to be a
dispute over "assignment of work" and hence unlawful-completely
disregarding the fact that wage rates at the new mill were substantially
lower than those provided in the union agreement, so that the Union
had valid economic objectives as well.
The problem is further confused by a decision such as that in
International Association of Machinists." In that case there had been a
long-standing dispute between the Machinists and the Carpenters, cover-
ing millwright work. At a time when there was no millwright work
being performed, except by one subcontractor holding an agreement with
the Machinists, the Machinists demanded, and struck for, a contract
clause providing that millwright work could be subcontracted only ta
employers under agreement with the Machinists. The Board held that
Section 8 (b) (4) (D) had not been violated, on the ground
that there was no demand for any present assignment of work, as con-
templated by the Act, but merely a contract demand covering the selec-
tion of subcontractors. The decision seems entirely correct, and presum-
ably the same result would have followed if the Machinists had demanded
a contract clause specifying that the appropriate bargaining unit which
they represented should include millwrights, or had demanded a simple
clause giving them "jurisdiction" over millwright work. But had the
Machinists waited until millwright work was being performed, and then
demanded that it be "assigned" to them, their strike would have been
unlawful. The decision illustrates that the concepts of "appropriate
unit", "jurisdiction" and "assignment of work" are frequently over-
lapping, and sometimes identical, and that differing legal results vil
follow depending upon the epithet initially used to describe the dispute.
In the field of inter-union disputes, therefore, the Board's willingness
to accept, or reject, "assignment of work" cases under Section 8 (b) (4)
(D) has an important bearing on problems arising under Section 9.
In a number of cases the Board has followed the salutary principle
of declining jurisdiction where voluntary machinery for settlement of
30 107 N.L.R.B. No. 237 (1954).
37 101 N.L.R.B. 346 (1952).
38 Manhattan Construction Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 104-5 (1951); Teamsters, Local
236, 97 N.L.R.B. 1003; Roy Stone Transfer Corp., 99 N.L.R.B. 662 (1952).
39 108 N.LR.B. No. 50 (1954).
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these disputes existed. 8 But there have been disturbing signs of a retreat
from this approach. The fact that employers are not parties to such
voluntary agreements should certainly be irrelevant, yet it was on this
ground that the Board accepted jurisdiction of an inter-union dispute
in York Corp.3 9
It is now necessary to return to consideration of another issue.
COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS As BARS To ELECTIONS
The Board was early faced with the problem of directing an elec-
tion in the face of an existing collective agreement. Its initial reaction
was to give the fact little weight. In Black Diamond Steamship Co. 40
it directed an election in the face of an existing agreement, and noted
that
"The mere holding of the election will in no way affect
the rights and duties, if any, arising out of (the contract)."
Since the agreement there was about to expire, the Board noted that
"We deem it unnecessary to determine what would other-
wise be the effect of the contract on the petition before us."
While in theory the Board thereafter began to recognize an exist-
ing contract as a bar, the exceptions to this rule tended to overwhelm
the rule itself. In Superior Electrical Products Co.1" the Board dis-
missed a petition in the face of an existing agreement which had run for
only about six months "without prejudice to renewal at a reasonable
time before the expiration of the agreement." But the Board proceeded
in the face of existing agreements where the union did not represent
a majority when the contract was executed,42 or where the contracting
union had been assisted by the employer, 43 or where the agreement had
been entered into after the Board began its investigation,44 or where the
agreement had been renewed after filing of a petition, 45 or where an
existing agreement was about to expire,48 or where a five year agree-
ment had been in existence for more than one year,47 or where the
unit covered by the agreement was inappropriate, or where the contract
covered union members only, 49 or in a variety of other circumstances.
In Columbia Broadcasting System,"0 the Board laid it down as a rule
that no contract could be a bar which had already been in effect for one
year, in order "to prevent undue restriction on the selection of representa-
tives by employees." Where factional disputes raised doubts concerning
-102 N.L.R.B. 241 (1936).
416 N.L.R.B. 19 (1938).
42 Southern Chemical Cotton Co., 3 N.L.R.B. 869 (1937).
43 Mine B Coal Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 316 (1937).
44 American-West Africa Line, 4 N.L.R.B. 1086 (1938).
45 American France Line, 7 N.L.R.B. 79 (1938).
46Atlantic Footwear Co., 5 N.L.R.B. 252 (1938).
4"Metro-(Qoldwyn Mayer Studios, 7 N.L.R.B. 662 (1938).
4 8 Kinnear Manufacturing Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 773 (1938).
490Northrop Corporation, 3 N.L.R.B. 228 (1937).
t;08 N.LR.B. 508 (1938).
OHIO M7'ITE LAW JOURNA4L
the majority during the life of an agreement, the Board was entirely
disposed to resolve the issue. 5 ' Even if it found that an election was
barred by an agreement, it frequently directed merely that the case
be held in abeyance until shortly before the agreement was to expire.
2
'Gradually, a shift from this liberality made itself felt. In Eaton
Mdnufacturing Co.>53 an agreement was held to be a bar though it was
open to the technical objection that it had not been duly ratified by the
union membership. In Hettrick Manufacturing Co..?4 it was held that an
oral claim of majority prior to renewal of an agreement did not remove
the contract as a bar, and the doctrine of that case was given an appreciable
extension in Mill B. Inc.5 5 where the Board held that a one-year contract,
automatically renewed for another year, would be a bar during its second
year unless a rival union filed a petition for an election before the parties
were required, under the agreement, to give notice of their intention to
renegotiate the agreement. Under that case, a contract might therefore
bar an election, whatever its actual duration, unless rival unions gave
timely notice. By 1941, the Board in Owens-Illinois Pacific Coast Co.,56
recognized two-year agreements which were "typical of the industry" as
bars during their lives. This gradually evolved into a rule of "reasonable
duration"57 and -by 1946, the Board was prepared to find that a three year
agreement was a bar where it was shown that such agreements were
customary in the industry and locality."8 Rather surprisingly, the Board
during the World World II treated agreements terminable "upon cessa-
tion of hostilities" or for the "duration of the national emergency" as
contracts for an indefinite period and therefore not bars to elections;
5 9
the necessity for stabilized labor relations during that period might well
have dictated another result.
The Board since the World War II has continued the policy of
granting increased respect to existing agreements. In Kimberley Clark
Corp.,6" the Board tied together the one-year certification rule and its con-
tract bar rules, with the result that a new election would not be held dur-
ing the life of an agreement concluded during the one-year period follow-
ing a prior election. In General Electric X-Ray Co.,6 rival unions were
required to file a petition for an election within ten days after giving
notice of a claim of majority in order to prevent an automatically
51 Brewster Aeronautical Corp. 14 N.L.R.B. 1024 (1939).
52 Oppenheimer Casing Co., 13 N.LR.B. 300 (1939).
53 29 N.L.R.B. No. 12 (1941).
5425 N.L.R.B. No. 79 (1940).
55 40 N.L.R.B. No. 346 (1942).
56 36 N.I.R.B. 990 (1941).
57 United States Finishing Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 575 (1945).
5 Oman, Incorporated, 69 N.L.R.B. No. 135 (1946).
59 Heinsheimer Bros., 69 N.L.R.B. No. 28 (1946); Cotton Trade Warehouses,
68 N.L.R.B. No. 7 (1946); International Harvester Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 133 (1945).
60 61 N.L.R.B. 90 (1945).
6167 N.L.R.B. 997 (1946).
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renewed contract from being held a -bar. In Reed Roller Bit Co.,
62
the Board explicitly noted its changing policy, stating that in -the ex-
perimental and transitional period which followed adoption of the
Wagner Act:
It was especially necessary, therefore, to lay emphasis upon
the right of workers to select and change their representatives.
Now, however, this emphasis can be better placed elsewhere.
We think the time has come when stability of industrial relations
can be better served.
by recognizing in all cases that two-year agreements, irrespective of the
custom of the industry, should bar new elections.
63
THE EFFECT OF TAFT-HARTLEY ON CoNTRAcT BARs
In 1950, the United Automobile Workers obtained a five-year
agreement with the major automobile companies. Consistent with earlier
trends, the NLRB recognized these agreements as 'bars to elections for
their duration.6
4
The Taft-Hartley Act was silent on the subject of contracts as
bars; by necessary implication, the Congress therefore adopted the general
position of the NLRB. Despite this, the Act has had important repercus-
sions, in that it has furnished the NLRB with additional reasons for
holding agreements not to bar elections. The Board has insisted, to
the point of absurdity, that contracts literally comply, in all their pro-
visions, with the Act, in order to act as a -bar. For example, agreements
requiring employees to pay "special dues" (as well as regular monthly
dues)05 or assessments66 or containing an unauthorized union security
clause,67 have been held to be "illegal" and therefore not bars to new
elections. The Board here has indicated a willingness to unsettle a bar-
gaining relationship because the parties have been ill-advised, or merely
wrong, in estimating the statutory requirements. In adopting the Taft-
6272 N.LR.B. 927 (1947).
63 It is to be noted that the N.L.R.B. while granting an increased measure
of protection to existing agreements, was at the same time developing a labor
law rule against perpetuities. In Rutland Court Owners, Inc. 44 N.L.R.B. 587
(1942) it held that the discharge of workers for dual unionism under a closed
shop agreement, near the end of the contract term when a petition for a new
election would have been timely, was discriminatory. The status of this line of
cases was cloudy (see Colgate-Palmolive-Feet v. NLRB, 338 U.S. 355 (1949))
and has in any event been made irrelevant by Sections 8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2) of
the Taft-Hartley Act which (unwisely, in my view) forbid discharges for dual
union activity at any time. In Wichita Union Stockyards, 40 N.L.R.B. 369 (1942),
the NLRB announced its "premature extension" rule; i.e., that a new agree-
ment made prior to the automatic renewal date of an existing contract would
not bar a petition otherwise timely filed. The obvious purpose of both rules
was to deny an incumbent union perpetual tenure through use of these
devices.
64 Bendix Aviation Corp.
6Federal Telephone and Radio Corp. 98 N.L.R.B. 1324 (1952).
06International Harvester Co., 95 N.LR .B. 730 (1951).
67 Aluminum Company of America, 96 N.L.RB. 781 (1951).
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Hartley Act the Congress demonstrated, somewhat emphatically, that the
NLRB was not to assume the task of policing agreements, or union rules.
Section 8 (b) (1) shows an explicit intention that the NLRB is not to
enter the latter field. Section 301, by granting the Federal Courts a wider
jurisdiction over suits for contract violations, showed that the Congress
wished to follow the traditional rule that the courts, not the NLRB, should
interpret and enforce agreements. In adopting the Act, the Congress
expressly declined to accept an amendment which would have made
a violation of an agreement an unfair labor practice, on the expressed
ground that these matters should be left to the courts.6" The action of
the Supreme Court in appearing to hold that the NLRB in these cases
is acting within its powers69 is not, of course, conclusive of the merit of
these decisions.
In two decades, therefore, the Board has moved from a position
which, in general, made every union vulnerable to a new election
at least yearly, to a position where the incumbency of a functioning
union could be prolonged beyond five years. These changes, reflecting
the increased maturity of the labor movement and of collective bargaining
relationships, seem wise responses. Without unduly hampering freedom
of choice, they give the parties assurance of a settled relationship, dis-
courage raiding, and permit orderly administration of agreements. Too
often the NLRB has made it appear that it sought to protect the "sanctity
of contracts" rather than a settled bargaining relationship; a policy
akin to that of a domestic relations court which strove to preserve marriage
licenses rather than marriages. But, on the whole, the current of de-
cision has followed industrial developments.
OTHER LIMrrATIONS ON DIRECTION OF ELECTIONS
In the first years of the Board's work, a number of other doctrines
began to develop which limited access to the Board's election machinery.
The Act was silent on the matter, but it was entirely clear that if a
certification were to have any meaning its validity for some period of
time had to be recognized. The Board early began the formulation of
the rule that certifications, in the absence of unusual circumstances, would
bar another election for a period of one year." Tnitially the problem was
treated, not as a question of the validity of a certification, but of the
effect of a prior electio'n.71 The Board gave no effect to such a prior
election where it had been conducted by an employer72 or where a com-
68 H. R. REP. No. 510, 80th CONG., 1st SESS. (1947) explained the deletion
of such provisions on the ground that "Once parties have made a collective bar-
gaining contract the enforcement of that contract should be left to the usual
processes of law and not to the National Labor Relations Board."
6 9 Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
70 National Sugar Refining Company, 4 N.L.R.B. 276 (1937).
71 see 4 N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 138 (1938).
72 Heller Bros. Co., 7 N.L.R.B. 636 (1938).
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pany dominated union appeared on the ballot 3 , or where the employer
had interfered in the election 74 or where electioneering was prohibited.'
If no certification resulted, the Board directed another election 7' and
it would consider petitions during the life of a certification if it was
apparent that the election results could not be tallied until the certification
was over a year old.71 By the time its fifth annual report was issued,
the Board was able to state that it had generally refused to proceed with
an investigation less than a year after a prior determination and certifica-
tion of representatives.7"
The "one year certification" rule has remained substantially un-
changed since its adoption. The Taft-Hartley Act made no change in
this rule, but gave it a new importance by providing in Sections 8 (b)
(4) (B) and (C) that strikes and boycotts against Board certifications
were unfair labor practices; in failing to state during what period a
certification remains effective, it has raised new and difficult problems.7 9
It was early evident that the holding of an election was futile if
the petitioning labor organization had no substantial representation among
the employees. In Williams Dimond"° the Board early dismissed a
petition where it appeared that only five of about seventy employees
involved had joined the union. Subsequently, this was evolved into a
rule of "substantial adherence", which depended upon the facts in each
case."1 Still later, by administrative rule, this crystallized into a rule
that before the Board would direct an election a petitioning union should
show adherence of thirty per cent of the eligible voters, except in cases
where a closed-shop agreement was in effect.
Certain other matters merit brief mention. The Board early adopted
an "extent of organization" rule. 2 That rule recognized as appropriate
a unit smaller than the Board would normally approve, depending upon
the extent to which unions had organized the employees on the ground
that "it is obviously desirable that, in the determination of the appropriate
unit, we render collective bargaining of the company's employees an
immediate possibility". The rule was of substantial utility in aiding unions
to organize far-flung groups of employees. The Taft-Hartley Act
73 S. Bechman and Sons, Inc., 4 N.L.R.B. 15 (1937).
74 United Carbon Co., 7 N.L.R.B. 598 (1938).
75 Minneapolis-Moline Power Implement Co., 7 N.L.R.B. 840 (1938).
76Pacific Greyhound Lines, 9 N.L.R.B. 557 (1938).
77Waterman Steamship Co., 10 N.L.R.B. 1079 (1939).
787 N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 55 (1940).
7 See United Mine Workers, 106 N.L.R.B. No. 153 (1953).
801 N.L.R.B. 371 (1936).
81Thus, in Nevada California Corporation, 20 N.L.R.B. No. 2 (1940) the
Board required only a small showing because of the employer's "avowed opposi-
tion" to the Union. In Ward Baking Co., 21 N.L.R.B. No. 44 (1940) only a
small showing was required in the face of a closed shop agreement.
82 Gulf Oil Corporation, 4 N.L.R.B. 133 (1937).
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muddied the problem by providing, in Section 9 (c) (5) that "the extent
to which employees have organized shall not be controlling", leaving open
the question whether it might be considered. In practice, the Board has
abandoned the doctrine which had largely served its purpose in any
event.
Another vexing problem was that of multiple-employer units. In
1939 it was held that the Board had power to find a multiple employer
unit appropriate.8 3 In Shipowners Association of the Pacific Coast," the
Board found proper a unit of the employees of all West Coast waterfront
longshore employers, the consequence of which would have been to
exclude AF of L unions from longshoring work at certain ports. Though
later reversed 85 the initial decision did much to widen the breach between
the Board and the American Federation of Labor. The hearings on
amendments to the Act in 1939 publicized the breach, and though no
legislation resulted, they marked the beginning of a determined Con-
gressional drive for amendments which culminated in the Taft-Hartley
Act of 1947.
The years of World War II brought some new problems. The first
was the "expanding unit" problem, brought about by the mushrooming of
large enterprises under the impact of war conditions. The Board re-
sponded by holding that a new election would be held within less than
one year if fifty per cent of the total complement of employees had not
been hired at the time of the first election, and by not treating as bars
contracts in cases where the work force had more than doubled, or where
the plant had been transferred to another city.8" "Reconversion" after
the War brought some new problems, principally dealing with "con-
tracting" rather than "expanding" units, which did not, however, require
sharp changes in Board policies.
CONCLUSIONS
From this brief review, certain conclusions may appropriately be
drawn. The statutory objectives of "freedom of association", "effective
collective bargaining" and "stabilization" of industrial relations are not
identical, and each Board member has been faced with a choice of em-
phasis among them. "Rules" are perhaps useful, but in a field depending
ultimately on a nice judgment, they represent more a formulation of the
individual Board members' views than criteria which can be predictably
applied. Parties before the NLRB will stress such of these considerations
as happen to support their position, largely depending upon whether they
seek -to change or maintain an established position.
The problem is not essentially different from that which faces a
83 NLRB v. Lune, 103 F. 2d 815 (8th Cir. 1939).
847 N.L.R.B. 1002 (1938).
85 Shipowners Association of the Pacific Coast, 32 N.L.R.B. 124 (1941).
86 Chase Brass and Copper, Inc., 47 N.L._R.B. 298 (1943); Sardik Food
Corp., 46 N.L.R.B. 894 (1942); Aluminum Company of America, 49 N.L.R.B.
1431 (1943), 51 N.L.R.B. 1295 (1943), 52 N.L.RB. 1040 (1943).
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legislature in redistricting a state; it involves the finding of a practical
political solution rather than the making of a moral judgment. Employees
do not have a "right" to be in one unit rather than another, more than
the citizen has a "right" to be in a particular Congressional district. In
consequence, the Board, the courts, the Congress, labor and management
have been equally unsuccessful in finding an acceptable formula, ap-
plicable to all, or even most, disputed cases.
It is apparent that there are important considerations to be weighed
against individual or group freedom of choice. Collective bargaining and
trade unionism constitute a form of industrial government; like other
forms of government, this implies the ability to exercise some degree of
coercion. "Majority rule", which is written into the statute and which
no one proposes to change, is the clearest example. Every form of
representative government must necessarily curtail freedom of choice
for a period after a choice has been made, if the representatives are to
have any opportunity to discharge the functions for which they have
been selected. An essential statutory objective is the stability of the
collective agreement, which must be respected. There is an alternative,
not present in the political field, in the opportunity normally afforded
union members to change their representatives within the union itself.
There are economic factors, thus far given little or no weight
by the Congress or the NLRB, which may also call for some limitations.
The freedom of a group of dissidents to hold themselves aloof, and to
undercut the carefully erected structure of wage rates in an industry,
does not appear so sacred that it should be protected against all coercion,
whether through pressures on the employer or otherwise. Accommodations
between unions may make it highly desirable to transfer "jurisdiction"
over a group of employees; the interest of industrial order is not to be
entirely neglected because this may involve some loss of freedom of
choice. In short, if industrial government is not to become industrial
anarchy, the needs of that government must be consulted as well as
those of the governed.
Lest these observations be misunderstood, it is dear that freedom
of choice must remain an important objective. Only a police state could
fix, once and for all, the union affiliations of workers, and the oppor-
tunity for orderly and deliberate change is in itself a condition of industrial
stability. Rivalry and competition within the labor movement has
its proper place, and the changing industrial scene will continually call for
new patterns and accommodations. My only purpose has been to stress,
what is perhaps obvious, that "freedom of choice" cannot be the touch-
stone to the solution of vexed problems.
A challenging opportunity now faces the Board, management and
labor. The last several months have seen the conclusion of an impressive
number of no-raiding agreements between unions, which mark juris-
dictional boundaries and provide voluntary machinery for settling disputes
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that arise. There have been a number of mergers of unions in the same
fields, which should operate to diminish somewhat the area of inter-union
conflict. The projected merger of the AF of L and the CIO should
give additional impetus to these developments. A chief goal of all parties
should be the encouragement of these trends.
Manifestly, if the NLRB assumes jurisdiction of such inter-union
disputes, in cases where unions have made arrangements for their ad-
judication, unions have little incentive to establish appropriate machinery,
or having established it, to abide by it. The opportunity for a second
bite at the apple, before a governmental tribunal with enforcement
powers, offers the losing party strong incentives and undermines come
pletely the authority of the voluntary machinery. The Board will not
extricate itself from the field of inter-union disputes, as I believe it
should, unless it accords the utmost deference to such voluntary
mechanisms.
No one has suggested that the jurisdictional disputes machinery
provided by Section 8 (b) (4) (D) of Taft-Hartley has worked well,
if indeed it has worked at all. The normal result has been to impress
the Board's seal of approval on the employer's assignment of work,
usually well after the fact, and often after the damage has been done.
Employers may welcome this governmental approval of their actions,
but its practical utility is open to question. The semantic difficulties of
distinguishing between a dispute about an "appropriate unit", or "juris-
diction", or "assignment of work" are well-nigh insoluble, and it appears
that differing legal consequences depend solely on the name originally
applied to the disagreement.
Employers have much to gain-in speed and finality of resolution
of such disputes, by whatever name called-through settlements achieved
by voluntary trade union machinery, rather than the Government. The
trade union movement has traditionally opposed, and continues to oppose,
decision of these matters by the Government, for the sufficient reason
that the power to shape the future structure of the trade union movement
should be determined -by its members, and not by outside agencies
or decisions imposed by law. The effort of the NLRB to decide these
issues, more than any other single factor, has prejudiced its work and its
prestige. The decisions in Globe, American Can, National Tube and
American Potash have, each in their turn, been followed by outcries
from labor leaders or employers who thought themseJves thereby injured.
In the relatively stable climate of labor relations which we now enjoy,
the NLRB has the opportunity to doff its hair shirt.
Attainment of this ideal will require a major effort. Labor must
address itself more zealously than ever to erecting effective voluntary
machinery, and providing adequate sanctions. Since unions do not have
autocratic powers over their members, it would be naive to suppose that
success will always 'be attained. Employers, therefore, must be prepared
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to exercise a certain forebearance when the inevitable frictions arise. The
NLRB can do much to encourage these trends by consciously reviving
and strengthening the doctrines of the Axton-Fisher and Manhattan
Construction cases, maintaining as far as possible a hands-off attitude in
inter-union conflicts where appropriate voluntary machinery is available.
The frequent observation that this means a return to the "law of the
jungle" seems singularly unappealing; it implies that any decision of the
Government to leave problems to the unsupervised determination of
responsible citizens is wrong, because it is disorderly. The objective is to
assign these matters for decision to tribunals voluntarily established-the
antithesis of the "law of the jungle".
This is not the place to examine the manifold advantages of a system
of free labor-which means, precisely, freedom from Government con-
trol. If the mid-30s called for a degree of governmental intervention un-
known to that point, the need has largely dissipated. The present members
of the NLRB have shown a commendable tendency in various ways to
diminish the degree to which the Government will assume responsibility
for these decisions, though working in opposite directions on occasion.
I believe that they can now make their greatest contribution by the
adoption of policies which respect orderly and settled collective bargaining
relationships, the use of voluntary machinery for the settlement of
inter-union conflicts, and the right of parties to make such agreements
as they choose with a minimum of governmental supervision.
